REMEMBRANCE DAY 2022

The Vernon Snowflakes are caught as they overfly downtown Salmon Arm during the Remembrance Day ceremonies in that city. Salmon Arm was just one of the locals overflown by the formation; during the hour plus flight, they also overflew Lumby, Lavington, Coldstream, Vernon, Armstrong, Enderby, and Sicamous.

The aircraft, all two-seaters, are owned and flown by the pilots who included Steve Foord (Lead), Hammy McClymount, Chuck Ross, Steve Swallow, Stu McLean, John Swallow, Franz Fux, Rob Kennett, and Ron Townson.

This is what the Remembrance Day formation looked like from the Number 9 position. The photo was snapped from the back seat of Ron Townson's aircraft, a Van's RV-8, by his wife, Barb Townson. (Well done, Barb!)

A SAD TALE

George lives in Perth, Ont. He was sick of the world, of Covid-19, Trump, Russian belligerence, War in Ukraine, China, global warming, racial tensions, supply chain disruptions, rising prices, inflation and the rest of the disturbing stories that occupy media headlines.

George drove his car into his garage and then sealed every doorway and window as best he could. He got back into his car and opened all the windows, selected his favorite radio station, started the car and set it to a slow idle.

Five days later, a worried neighbor peered through his garage window and saw him in the car. She notified the emergency services, they sent an ambulance and they broke in, pulling George from the car.

After a sandwich and a little sip of water, surprisingly, George was in perfect condition, but his Tesla had a dead battery.

Cycling a Prop

Featuring Wally Moran

"The pitch on your constant speed propeller is controlled by the propeller governor which uses engine oil to do the work. When you start your engine for the first flight of that day, the engine oil is cold and viscous. Viscous means it flows like molasses and therefore does not do a good job of controlling the propeller pitch. But since during taxi, the propeller stays in low pitch that's not a big deal. During this time the governor does not need to regulate anything. That's going to be different when we apply takeoff power.

While we taxi, the engine oil is starting to warm up slowly but because the propeller stays in low pitch during this time, the warmer oil does not necessarily circulate to that area.

When we do the runup, cycling the propeller a few times exchanges the colder oil in the propeller with the relatively warmer oil from the crankcase. This is a good thing because when we add full power for takeoff, the propeller governor needs to get busy and control the pitch. We need full RPM but we don't want an overspeed. Both of those things are the job of the governor.

The engine oil usually stays warm for a long time after a flight, so cycling the propeller only once on subsequent flights is enough to confirm that everything is working properly. Exceptions to this may be required in very cold climates.

There is an aviation myth that three cycles were required to check for, first an RPM drop, second an oil pressure change and last a manifold pressure increase. No such requirement or even recommendation appears in any POH I have ever read. But since the book said to do it three times, I guess somebody invented something to do while this was going on."

Question: For those of you who fly with constant speed props, which method do you use?

1. Three times before EVERY flight?
2. Three times on first flight of day; once thereafter?
3. Once on every flight?

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1. I can't believe I got fired from the calendar factory. All I did was take a day off.
2. Most people are shocked when they find out how bad I am as an electrician.
3. My wife just found out I replaced our bed with a trampoline. She hit the ceiling!
4. I always take life with a grain of salt. And a slice of lemon. And a shot of tequila.

Homebuilt Accidents: Captains Vs. Fledglings

How does pilot experience affect the accident rate?

By
Ron Wanttaja
-
November 10, 2022

Loss of directional control on landing has only one good aspect—such accidents are rarely fatal. (Photo: NTSB)

Considerable insights can be gained by examining aircraft accident statistics. But sometimes—well, the results aren't earth-shattering, but can be interesting nonetheless.

Take the issue of pilot experience. We would certainly expect more-experienced pilots to make fewer mistakes. But what's the actual difference?

It's not something that's only relevant to homebuilts. But my Experimental/Amateur-Built aircraft accident database gives us the opportunity to easily compare the accident causes for pilots at various levels of experience.

One little surprise does pop up…

Data

About 4000 accidents in my 22-year database (1998–2019) include the pilot's total time. Pilots involved in homebuilt accidents have a median total flight time of about 1000 hours. The most experienced pilot had 42,000 hours. On the other end of the spectrum, 10 accidents featured pilot total time of zero hours. Most were ultralight-type vehicles, although the aircraft had N-numbers.



Figure 1: With nearly equal sample sets, it's obvious that with increasing pilot experience the rate of stick-and-rudder errors decreases. However, the increase in accidents due to loss of directional control when landing is interesting.

We don't have a reliable source of statistics regarding the distribution of flying experience across the entire homebuilt fleet. So we'll use the accident database and compare the causes of accidents. We'll set up three sets, nearly equal in size, to compare. The sets will include all homebuilt accidents where the pilot's total time was within the given range.

One hundred and forty-eight accidents occurred to pilots with 20,000 or more hours. We'll call this the "ATP" set, though not all had airline transport pilot ratings (and not all ATPs are included).

A good comparison would be newly minted private pilots, so the second comparison set covers pilots who had 40 to 100 hours at the time of their accident. With 158 total accidents, it provides a close match in size to our ATP group. We'll refer to these as the "Private" group, although, again, not all have private certificates.

We need something in the middle, so why not look at pilots around our 1000-hour median? There are 144 cases in the 1000- to 1150-hour range; we'll call these the "Mid-Time" set.

The NTSB couldn't determine if this accident was due to pilot miscontrol or mechanical issues. (Photo: FAA)

Comparing The Accident Causes

The primary factor to be concerned with is pilot miscontrol. This category covers errors in the physical control of the aircraft. It doesn't include judgment issues such as running out of fuel.

Results are probably pretty much as expected: About 51% of the accidents in the Private set are due to miscontrol, versus 37% for the Mid-Time set and 30% for the ATPs.

I'll admit the ATP results came out higher than I expected. Part of the explanation came out when the miscontrol accidents were looked at in more detail, as seen in Figure 1. As one might predict, the number of stall- or wind-related accidents decreased with pilot experience.



Figure 2: The typical pilot involved in a homebuilt accident has about 1000 hours total time. About 75% of the pilots have 2500 hours or fewer.

What was a surprise was the result under "Landing Directional." This category refers to the pilot losing directional control during landings. Note that Figure 1 does not show the percentage of accidents—it's the actual number of cases, comparing near-equal-size sets. And it shows that the most experienced pilots suffer more accidents due to losing control on landing: only five of the 158 accidents in the Private set, versus 19 out of the 148 in the ATP set. Three times the number of accidents! Over 40% of the ATP set's pilot miscontrol accidents are loss of directional control on landing.

What's more, we're seeing similar results in the Mid-Time set: 15 out of 144 accidents.

Why?

?

?

The Answer, In One Word

Taildraggers. Fourteen of the 19 loss of directional control on landing cases for the ATP set had conventional gear.

Almost 60% of the total accidents in the ATP set involved taildragger aircraft, versus less than 40% for the Private set. The Mid-Time set was also higher.

You'd think that the ATP taildragger accidents would tend to occur during initial checkout. Of the 14 cases, though, only two have a time-in-type indicative of the first or second flight in the airplane. Four of the pilots had over 100 hours in type.



Figure 3: The number of taildragger accidents increases as pilot experience levels rise. This is undoubtedly due to increased popularity of conventional-gear aircraft, not decreased ability to handle them.

Lessons

It's said that the Piper J-3 is the safest airplane in the world because it can just barely kill you.

But it should be obvious that 30 years of flying a 767 from Tedium to Apathy and back doesn't really prepare you for flying said J-3 Cub. Nor a Kitfox, nor a Starduster, nor an RV without the "A" in the model name.

There's no question that conventional-gear aircraft appeal to older professional pilots. The ATP accident set has about one-third more taildraggers than the Private set, irrespective of whether the accident was due to loss of control of the airplane during landing.

Overall, more-experienced pilots suffer fewer accidents due to stick-and-rudder mistakes. They maintain proper airspeeds, handle winds better and avoid porpoising and botching the flare.But airplanes don't care if their pilots are 40-hour fledglings or 30,000-hour sky gods. The high-time folks may find flying more natural and automatic. But the airplane just doesn't care.

Give the aircraft your best, whether the card in your wallet says student or ATP.

This article originally appeared KITPLANES.

Ghoulish things that happened at the Vernon Flying Club during Halloween. At left, Alison Crerar appears to be dealing with a headless Luc Mailloux while, at right, Kathy Jorimann appears to be attempting to fend off Alison. Or, they're conjuring up spells…

A friend of mine is organizing a trip to England next year to take in the events as listed below. You can contact Rob Darrah if you're interested in more detail and then contact John Simon for bookings, etc…

AVIATION TOUR TO GREAT BRITAIN

AVIATION TOUR 2023

Sept. 13 Arrive London / Meet for Casual dinner at Mapleleaf Bar
Sept. 14 Transfer to Imperial War Museum ,Luncheon at the Museum
Sept. 15 Transfer to Churchill War Rooms2 / Afternoon Transfer to Duxford
Sept.16 Battle of Britain Airshow (Gold Experience tickets)
Sept.17 Battle of Britain Airshow (two days allows for static display viewing and also a rain delay)
Sept.18 Transfer to RAF Museum at Cosford
Sept.19 Transfer RAF London/ Hendon Transfer to London Hotel and farewell dinner.(included)
Sept.20 Flight Home

Contacts for details

Rob Darrah (your host) redarrah@gmail.com

John Simon (your travel organizer)
info@kefitravel.ca

www.historicaviation.biz

LITTLE JOHNNIE AGAIN

Little boy comes home and tells his mom about "Gladly, the cross eyed bear" they sang about at Sunday School.

Mom, of course, phones her friend whose child attends the same church to inquire about the song.
Turns out the song included the line "Gladly the Cross I'd bear…"

WAS YEAGER THE FIRST?

HANS GUIDO MUTKE (25 March 1921 – 8 April 2004) was a fighter pilot for the German Luftwaffe during World War II. He was born in Neisse, Upper Silesia (now Nysa, Poland).



On 25 April 1945, Mutke landed at Dübendorf, Switzerland, flying the Me 262A-1a jet fighter, 'White 3', from 9. Staffel, Jagdgeschwader 7. He claimed that he got lost during a combat mission and landed there by mistake, although there were suspicions that he'd defected. The Swiss authorities never attempted to fly the plane, keeping it in storage and returning it to Germany on 30 August 1957. He sued the post-war German government, unsuccessfully, for the return of the plane, claiming it was his own property.

Mutke also made the controversial claim that he broke the sound barrier in 1945 in an Me 262, but mainstream opinion continues to regard Chuck Yeager as the first person to achieve this milestone in 1947 in a Bell X-1.

On 9 April 1945, Fähnrich Mutke, part of the Ergänzungs-Jagdgeschwader 2 (EJG 2) conversion squadron, 3rd flight, took off from Lagerlechfeld in his Messerschmitt Me 262, marked Weiße 9, for a planned high-altitude flight. He was climbing through at an altitude of 12,000 m (36,000 ft) in near perfect weather with a visibility of over 100 km, listening to the radio conversations, when his chief instructor Oberstleutnant Heinz Bär detected a P-51 Mustang approaching the plane of a comrade, Unteroffizier Achammer, from behind.

Mutke went into a steep 40° dive with full engine power. While passing through the altitude of 12,000 m, his Me 262 started to vibrate and began swinging from side to side. The airspeed indicator was stuck against its limit of 1,100 km/h (684 mph) (the maximum speed of the Me 262 is 870 km/h). The speed of sound is 1,062 km/h (660 mph) at an altitude of 12,000 m, depending on the environmental variables. The shaking intensified, and Mutke temporarily lost control of his plane. He reported that with the airspeed indicator still off the scale he attempted to recover from the uncontrollable dive by adjusting the main tailplane incidence angle. Rather than just having a hinged elevator, the Me 262 could change the angle of incidence of the whole tailplane, a design feature that was later added to the Bell X1. Suddenly, the buffeting stopped, and control resumed for a few seconds. Mutke throttled back and his engines flamed out, and after the short period of smooth flight, the buffeting resumed and the aircraft began shaking violently again. He fought to regain control and re-light the engines eventually reducing the speed below 500 km/h. After a difficult landing, it was found that his plane was missing many rivets and also had distorted wings.[citation needed]

At the time, Mutke did not understand the reasons for this strange behavior. Only after learning about the supersonic flights of Chuck Yeager in 1947 did he attribute these phenomena to the effects of supersonic flight and claim to have broken the sound barrier—years before Yeager did. This claim is disputed, and there are a number of other pilots and countries that claim the first supersonic flight. However, Mutke never claimed he was the first person to break the sound

barrier, but instead argued that his flight was merely proof that the Me 262 was capable of reaching and exceeding Mach 1 and that therefore other German fighter pilots may have done so even before him.

n a series of carefully controlled flight tests conducted in World War II by Messerschmitt, it was established that the Me 262 went out of control in a dive at Mach 0.86, and that higher Mach numbers would lead to a nose-down trim that could not be counter-acted by the pilot by use of the control column. The resulting steepening of the dive would lead to even higher speeds and self-destruction of the airframe due to excessive negative G loads. Postwar testing by the British government corroborated Messerschmitt's results, though neither actually exceeded Mach 0.86.

Mutke claimed to have overcome the ever steepening dive by adjustment of the 262's tailplane incidence. This is the same technique employed by Chuck Yeager in the Bell X-1 to avoid what is known as Mach tuck. Furthermore, Mutke's observation that he briefly regained control of the aircraft, while still accelerating, corresponds with later accounts of supersonic flight.

After the war, American test pilots filed reports about the Me 262, including the possibility of a speed of Mach 1. Compressibility in pitot tubes of the time often resulted in exaggerated speed readings near the speed of sound, particularly in German equipment, which was adversely affected by supply shortages as the war progressed. American Sabrejets and other high-speed aircraft (including the Bell X-1) also experienced anomalous airspeed readings in the high-subsonic flight regime (between 0.8 Mach and Mach 1). The Me 262's pre-area rule fuselage would have additionally resulted in very high transonic drag, and its engines were already underpowered and temperamental to begin with. However, aircraft such as the Bell X-1, F-86 Sabre and Convair F2Y Sea Dart similarly did not have area ruled fuselages, yet are acknowledged to have flown at supersonic speeds — here the engine thrust, either alone or in combination with the pull of gravity during a dive, supplies enough force to accelerate the airplane to supersonic speed.

Due to the nature of Mutke's combat flight, it is impossible to determine the exact speed of his plane, and it is also difficult to estimate the exact speed of sound at that temperature and altitude. Therefore, it is not possible to either prove or disprove his claims, and there is much discussion among experts as to whether the Me 262 was able to reach the speed of sound. It is believed that the damaging effects experienced by Mutke were a side effect of supersonic airstream and shock waves over different parts of the airframe, called buffeting. This effect occurs at speeds approaching Mach 1 but ceases above Mach 1. A number of other Me 262 experienced similar strange accidents, or breaking apart in the sky because of buffeting and the different aerodynamics at the sound barrier. Transonic buffeting effects had also been widely reported by pilots of propeller-driven Allied fighters including the Supermarine Spitfire, P-38 Lightning, P-47 Thunderbolt and P-51 Mustang, aircraft that were known to have top diving speeds of less than 0.85 Mach (although one Spitfire was measured at 0.92 Mach). Allied fighter pilots reported seeing supersonic shock waves and popped rivets during dives as the high-speed air rushing over the wing exceeded Mach 1 even though the forward airspeed of the overall aircraft was well below that speed.

Hans Guido Mutke's Me 262 A-1a/R7 on display at the Deutsches Museum

Many proponents of the claim also believe that after the end of the war the Allied powers had no interest in emphasizing any German achievements during the war. Mutke's claim, however, is without controlled, experimental confirmation.

A computer-based performance analysis of the Me 262 carried out in 1999 at the Technische Universität München concluded that the Me 262 could indeed exceed Mach 1.

HOW DEEP CAN WE GO?

(The question was asked on a website I came across recently with the response as shown….)

I have traveled to about 3.5 kilometers beneath the surface at the Western Deeps mine in South Africa. The problems of going deeper were obvious.

We had to descend three separate shafts to reach the face, which took over an hour. Shafts are limited to about 2,500 meters depth because the weight of the wire rope holding the man-carrying cage exceeds the strength of the rope. Even to reach that depth it is necessary to have a tapered rope.

The rock temperature was over 60 degrees C (140 degrees F). The mine pumped thousands of tons of slurried ice down the mine every day in order to maintain the air temperatures at workable levels.

Such depths are only possible because the rock surrounding the gold reefs is very strong. However the rock is subject to immense stress. Sometimes it breaks explosively in a 'rockburst'. A month earlier a rockburst had killed three miners.

The workings at the Mponeng shaft at that mine have now reached 4.2 kilometers below the surface.

The Russians drilled (not dug) a deeper hole at the Kola Superdeep hole. They had planned to go to 15 kilometers but stopped at 12.26 kilometers because the rock at 180 degrees C was hotter than expected. In a 23 cm (9 inch) wide hole it is not possible to pump down enough drilling fluid to keep the drill head cool.

Drilling so deep is tedious and expensive. Pulling out the 600 or so drill pipes in the string is very time-consuming every time the drill head needs replacing. Maintaining as straight a hole as possible when it is 12,000 meters long but only 23 centimeters wide is difficult. Too many turns and kinks in the hole cause unsustainable friction and forces on the drill pipe.

The temperature of the rock causes difficulties with drill fluid chemistry and degrades the strength of the drilling head and the drill pipe.

The same problem of supporting the weight of the pipe occurs and the hole must be tapered.

In short, a hole to a depth of 12 kilometers pushes drilling technology to the limit.

- Chris Seymour a mining engineer, graduate of the University of Newcastle on Tyne in the 1960s. During his career, he haS worked in Sierra Leone, Zambia, Australia, the US, China, South Africa, and Chile.

HOW LONG TO A PRIVATE PILOT LICENCE?

Therre has been many a discussion about how long it takes to get a private pilot licence - PPL. The following link gives a more realistic assessment and discusses the reasons why…

The 40 Hour Pilot Is A Myth! Change My Mind... - YouTube

Human Factors:
No one in command

By William E. Dubois · November 9, 2022

There's this great cartoon drifting around the internet. A little boy and his father are walking past an airliner and the child asks: "Dad, why are there always two pilots?"

The father replies, "One has to prevent the other from doing stupid things." To which the boy then asks: "Which one is doing the stupid things?"

To everyone's surprise, the **NTSB** recently released a report that answers that question: Both pilots.

The Accident

Following an avionics calibration flight in the early afternoon of Aug. 27, 2020, a trike-model **Van's RV6-A crashed** in a soybean field near Milton, Delaware. The aircraft cartwheeled, bending the tail, damaging both wings, snapping the prop off the crankshaft — and then flipped inverted, tearing the canopy off.

It ended its 25-minute flight a sad little pile of twisted two-tone blue aluminum amidst shredded dark green soybean plants.

Amazingly, both certificated pilots aboard escaped serious injury, no doubt thanks, in part, to the Hooker Harness 4-point restraints installed.

More amazingly, as it would turn out, neither pilot was flying the airplane.

The Flight

The day that ended in the soybeans started off simple enough. The owner of the airplane and a second pilot who had installed some glass panel avionics for the owner took to the sky to calibrate the new system.

The installer pilot was in the left seat and he handled the takeoff and the flight to 1,500 feet AGL. At that point, the owner took the controls and made a series of maneuvers so the installer pilot could calibrate the avionics. After the first set of calibrations, the installer took the controls again to demonstrate a function.

Shortly after that, the first link in the accident chain was forged.

The owner assumed that the installer retained control of the plane, while the installer assumed it had reverted back to the owner, so the installer went on to the next calibration task. The two pilots did not verbalize a positive exchange of controls.

At this point, one of them noticed that the alternator wasn't functioning, and they made the joint decision to return to the airport before the battery crapped out.

Then fate intervened.

While the installer was head down continuing additional calibration entries and the owner was head down admiring his new glass — both assuming the other "had the flight controls" — the aircraft made a gentle uncommanded turn, reinforcing each pilot's belief that the other had control, and had turned back to the airport as agreed.

It wouldn't be until after the crash that either one of them would have any clue that no one was flying the plane.

The Pilots

I'm sure at this point you want to know more about the two pilots.

The owner of the aircraft, who was seated in the right seat for the flight, was 55 years old at the time of the crash. He had a private certificate with an instrument rating.

The left-seat installer pilot was also a certificated private pilot, aged 38.

The owner had 2,140 hours, with 135 in make and model, while the younger pilot had 296 hours total time, 79 in make and model.

Some of the documents associated with the case say the owner had no flight time in the last 90 days, while other documents list 15.1 hours. The second pilot reported only three hours of flight time in the previous three months. Both were current on their medicals and flight reviews.

They had known each other for four or five years, but only talked to each other about once every six months or so, and had only flown together one time previously.

The Final Moments

In the final minutes there were yet more links in our accident chain, because the crash was one of those "third time's the charm" kinda things, at least if you believe in unlucky charms.

That's because before the final bellyflop into the soybeans, the airplane — not once, but two times — nearly smacked into the ground.

What on earth were the pilots thinking? They were each thinking that the other guy really sucked as a pilot.

Quoting the NTSB report, "both expressed discomfort with how the other was flying." Of course, neither of the men were flying. The NTSB goes on, "But neither communicated their concerns to the other in a way that was understood, nor did either confirm who was flying the airplane."

In fact, the younger pilot later said he thought the older pilot was "messing with him" or showing off "hotshot piloting," while the older, more experienced pilot probably thought the young pup just wasn't a very good stick.

The beginning of the impact scar in the soybean field. (Photos by FAA)

The NTSB

The NTSB classified this misadventure as a CFIT or Controlled Flight Into Terrain.

I'm not sure that's a fair characterization, given that no one was in control of the airplane.

The official probable cause finding is: "The pilot and owner's failure to adequately communicate and establish an understanding of who was flying the airplane, and their failure to take timely action to avoid a collision with terrain."

Beginning of the impact scar in the soybean field

Analysis and Discussion

Many people, quite fairly, ask how such a crash could happen with a side-by-side seating configuration.

Of course, the answer to that was that both pilots were head down with other tasks, in the happy delusion that the other was flying. The owner was checking out his pretty new glass, and the installer was finishing up some other settings. I'll give them a pass on that. But only so far. Because as both men expressed discomfort with how the other was "flying," why did they allow themselves to remain head down in such a circumstance?

Of course, we already know that being head down is dangerous, especially close to the ground. And we should also know by now that we need to speak up when we aren't comfortable with someone else's flying.

But it was the seating arrangement, and mythology around the left seat that is our learning moment — our key human factors takeaway — from this accident.

The Takeaway

Speaking to the NTSB air safety investigator assigned to the case, the owner pilot said that as he occupied the right seat, he considered himself the passenger — even though he was the owner and the more experienced pilot.

Interestingly, the younger, less-experienced installer pilot also felt the same way, telling the investigator, that as the pilot in the left seat, he should have taken more responsibility.

Really? The left seat is not the Throne, and sitting there doesn't make you King or Queen. If it did, every student pilot would be Pilot in Command on every training flight, and we know that's not the case.

The fact is the Pilot in Command can be in either seat, as suits the mission.

Which is why we have the whole positive exchange of control ritual in the first place. That: "You have the flight controls." "I have the flight controls." "You have the flight controls" thing. I actually prefer "you have the airplane" over "you have the flight controls" because it signifies a larger responsibility, but that's neither here nor there.

This accident clearly demonstrates that a positive exchange of flight controls isn't just a student pilot/flight training thing, but rather, a critical safety procedure any time two pilots share a cockpit.

The owner told the Investigator that his RV was "a wonderful airplane" and it was flying perfectly before the impact. Had the pair simply followed the flight control exchange ritual, the wonderful airplane would still be flying perfectly.

So do you practice the exchange ritual when you fly with other pilots? If not, will this incident change that?

The owner pilot also said one other thing that any pilot flying with another pilot needs to think about. He told the NTSB investigator that, "In my mind, when I'm in the right seat, I am the passenger. I am in passenger mode, and not thinking about flying."

What do you think? Can we, as certificated pilots, ever be in passenger mode?

William E. Dubois is a NAFI Master Ground Instructor, commercial pilot, two-time National Champion air racer, a World Speed Record Holder, and a FAASTeam Representative.

Suffer the little children…

A visiting minister waxed eloquent during the offertory prayer. "Dear Lord," he began with arms extended and a rapturous look on his upturned face, "without you, we are but dust..."

He would have continued but at that moment my very obedient daughter (who was listening carefully for a change!) leaned over to me and asked quite audibly in her shrill little girl voice, "Mom, what is butt dust?"

ATTENTION!!!

Anyone guilty of using the following words or phrases in the club house will have their ceremonial swords broken in two and will be drummed off the premises:

1. Supposably
2. For all intensive purposes
3. Irregardless
4. I could care less
5 Expresso
6. Pacifically
7. Excetera
8. I seen it
9. Of upmost importance
10 I need to lay down

You have been warned!

The Language Police

EUROPE IS WOXOF

21 December, 1961 The task is to return four local pilots from Prestwick, Scotland back to Zweibrucken, West Germany - 3 (F) Wing – after they had deposited their aircraft there for maintenance. Four T-33s are required for the job.

After an uneventful trip across the English Channel and England, we land in Scotland, meet up with our passengers and plan for the trip back. I was to be Number 3, leading the second section. Take off was to be in pairs, joining up immediately after take-off and returning to the continent as a four-plane.
Trouble reared its ugly head immediately after take-off: tower cleared us over to Departure and, once identified, we were cleared to a heading of 135 degrees or somesuch. We turn and upon roll out, I notice our heading is towards the southwest.
"What's your heading, lead"?
"135"
"I'm showing 240"
"Number three, you have the lead…"

And off we go for Europe.

The trip home was uneventful until we reached the continent and checked in with air traffic control. It was getting dark and atmospheric conditions would dictate our arrival formation back in Zweibrucken.
Our request for updated weather informartion revealed that unforecast fog was manifesting itself all over our area of interest. Zweibrucken, our destination, was rapidly going below visual flight conditions and our preferred alternates of the Canadian bases at Marville and Gros Tenquin in France and Baden Solingen in West Germany were following suit. All airports across Europe were experiencing the same phenomenon.

As we progressed eastbound, each query for weather updates revealed worsening conditions. Now well below visual conditions, each of other Canadian bases have slowly descended into IFR (Instrument Flight Rules) conditions. Like or not, we might as well stay with home base as our destination.
Complicating matters was the fact that none of the Canadian bases had ILS (Instrument Landing System) a ground-based navigation system which had the pilot follow left/right//up/down needles on a cockpit instrument. The only two methods of available to us were the non-precision ADF (automatic direction finding) which could be used to "break cloud" with ceilings of five hundred feet or higher or the more precise PAR (precision approach radar) which could bring us down to ceilings of two hundred feet or above. Whereas an ILS had the pilot interpret aircraft position from a cockpit gauge, the PAR had a ground operator interpret your position from a radar scope which he/she then passed on to you verbally.

We are now within twenty minutes of Zweibrucken and the weather continues to worsen as the fog continues to thicken. Complicating matters, night has overtaken us. Time to execute the plan which has been forming over the last half-hour or so.

Attempting formation letdowns in this weather would not be prudent, so I elect to let the pilots do individual approaches; I will be the last one to start down.

Air traffic control assigns everyone a different altitude and we start the daisy chain: first number two, then three, then four, and finally me.

A few turns in the holding pattern and then it's my turn to commence the approach. The 'guy-in-my-backseat" is also a pilot and we are both aware of the ramifications of not acquiring the runway at minimums – a missed approach and another try. However, it the first one is not successful and the weather is going down, the odds of making the runway on the second go are minimal…

By the beacon outbound at 20000 feet, the power is reduced to 65 percent and the speed brakes are thumbed out; when we hit 12000 feet, we start the procedure turn back towards the base. Upon rollout, Approach Control clears us over to our Final Controller.

As the final controller vectors us towards the runway, his information about the weather is not good: it is now after dark and the visibility is below radar limits which are two hundred feet of altitude and one half mile visibility. There is an indefinite ceiling at one hundred feet and the visibility is about one quarter mile.
It's quiet in cockpit; each of us is lost in our own thoughts as we thread our way through the fog-shrouded night and comply with the continuous heading instructions from the final controller. And then: "you're intercepting the glide path; commence a rate of descent appropriate for your aircraft".
We're about four miles back from the airport now: the gear is selected 'down' and the flaps are extended. Based on the ground speed of about 140 knots, our rate of descent should be 700 feet per minute. Given the fog situation, this is probably a reasonable supposition.
We are less than two minutes from the airport as the aircraft settles onto the glidepath and the controller keeps up a steady stream of corrections to "turn left/turn right" or "increase/decrease" rate of descent. I know the guy in the back seat is monitoring me like a hawk because we both know that this is neither his prime aircraft nor mine.
We continue to bore down on the glide path. There is no sensation of movement; with nothing on which to focus, we appear motionless in space with only heading changes, altitude and power adjustments to indicate that we are moving over the ground in excess of two miles a minute.

We hit two hundred feet above ground and the final controller breaks his continuous correction patter to intone: "You are through controller limits; continue at pilot's discretion" and goes right back into his corrections.
For the last quarter mile, I have been sneaking "peeks" outside in the hope of seeing a light on the ground, all to no avail. One of the problems with my home base is that there is no approach light on either end of the runway; only blue runway end lights. And they can only be seen 30 degrees either side of center.

We continue down in listening to the controller instructions.

Fifty feet below minimums. Nothing.

Seventy-five below minimums. Nothing.

I'm about to 'go missed' when a red light appears on my left in the gloom. I immediately know this is the obstruction light on the All Weather Fighter Squadron hangar and continue down. Another few seconds and very faint blue lights appear ahead. I ease off the power to reduce speed and I notice that the breathing of the back seater has increased substantially... Into what could be described as hyperventilation territory. However, I busy myself with landing the aircraft, thanking the controller, and switching to tower frequency and then to ground. We're cleared to our hangar.

Upon taxiing in, I note but two other aircraft on the ramp. To my query "Where's the other one?", I receive "He missed the approach and went around"…

However, before my concern could kick into high gear and cause a rush into the hangar to telephone the control tower for an update, the "missing chick" appeared out of the murk and was martialled into line. He must have been right behind me on the approach.

During the subsequent debrief, I asked my back seater about the sudden rise in his respiration just before touchdown. His response: "When we went by the red obstruction light on the AWF (440 Sqn) hangar, I thought it was the red obstruction light on the radar unit halfway down the runway. We were still fifty feet in the air and you were pulling off power."

AFTERWORD

Anyone who has flown IFR in the last thirty years or so might well ask "Why was not more use made of the resource in the back seat? He was a pilot, had got his wings on the T-33, flew the aircraft occasionally to maintain instrument proficiency, and could have flown the approach (acting as an autopilot), leaving the front seat pilot to manage the flight and only take over to land. If the decision was made to abort the approach, the front seater would just say "Go Around" and there would be no time lost in transitioning back to instrument flight."
Simple answer: PMA (Pilot Monitored Approaches) would not come into vogue for another ten or twenty years.

It seems like such a simple solution now, but, back then, It was just "not done"…

THE CURTAIN RODS

She spent the first day packing her belongings into boxes, crates, and suitcases. On the second day, she had the movers come and collect her things. On the third day, she sat down for the last time at their beautiful dining room table by candlelight, put on some soft background music, and feasted on a pound of shrimp, a jar of caviar, and a bottle of chardonnay.

When she had finished, she went into each and every room and stuffed half-eaten shrimp shells dipped in caviar into the hollow of all of the curtain rods. She then cleaned up the kitchen and left.

When the husband returned with his new girlfriend, all was bliss for the first few days. Then, slowly, the house began to smell. They tried everything: cleaning, mopping, and airing the place out. Vents were checked for dead rodents, carpets were steam cleaned, and air fresheners were hung everywhere!

Exterminators were brought in to set off gas canisters, during which they had to move out for a few days, and in the end, they even paid to replace the expensive wool carpeting. Nothing worked. People stopped coming over to visit. Repairmen refused to work in the house. The maid quit. Finally, they could not take the stench any longer and decided to move. A month later, even though they had cut their price in half, they could not find a buyer for their stinky house. Word got out, and, eventually, even the local realtors refused to return their calls. Finally, they had to borrow a huge sum of money from the bank to purchase a new place.

The ex-wife called the man and asked how things were going. He told her the saga of the rotting house. She listened politely and said that she missed her old home terribly and would be willing to reduce her divorce settlement in exchange for getting the house back. Knowing his ex-wife had no idea how bad the smell was, he agreed on a price that was about 1/10th of what the house had been worth, but only if she were to sign the papers that very day.

She agreed, and, within the hour, his lawyers delivered the paperwork.

A week later, the man and his girlfriend stood smiling as they watched the moving company pack everything to take to their new home, including the curtain rods.

Men aren't really cut out for this kind of fight…

Jacqueline Cochran was an American pilot and business executive. She pioneered women's aviation as one of the most prominent racing pilots of her generation. She set numerous records and was the first woman to break the sound barrier.

In 1952, Cochran, at age 47, decided to challenge the world speed record for women, then held by Jacqueline Auriol. She tried to borrow an F-86 from the U.S. Air Force, but was refused. She was introduced to an Air Vice-Marshal of the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) who, with the permission of the Canadian Minister of Defence, arranged for her to borrow 19200, the sole Sabre 3. Canadair sent a 16-man support team to California for the attempt. On 18 May 1953, Cochran set a new 100 km speed record of 1,050.15 km/h (652.5 mph). Later on 3 June, she set a new 15 km closed circuit record of 1078 km/h (670 mph). Encouraged by then-Major Chuck Yeager, with whom Cochran shared a lifelong friendship, on May 18, 1953, at Rogers Dry Lake, California, Cochran flew the Sabre 3 at an average speed of 652.337 mph. During the course of this run the Sabre went supersonic, and Cochran became the first woman to break the sound barrier.

VERNON FLYING CLUB / COPA Flight 65
2022 / 2023

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COPA Navigator:	Michael Crutchley
Newsletter Editor:	John Swallow

Meetings are held the third Tuesday of each month at 7:00 p.m.

NOTES:

1. Monthly VFC meeting Tuesday, 15 November 2022.
2. Pancake breakfast last Sunday of the month: 27 November 2022